Testing of Natural Resources as Blessing or Curse to the Knowledge Economy in Arab Countries by Driouchi, Ahmed
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Testing of Natural Resources as Blessing
or Curse to the Knowledge Economy in
Arab Countries
Ahmed Driouchi
IEAPS, Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco
15. September 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58598/
MPRA Paper No. 58598, posted 17. September 2014 04:45 UTC
Testing of Natural Resources as Blessing or Curse 
to the Knowledge Economy in Arab Countries 
 
By:  
Ahmed Driouchi,  
Institute of Economic Analysis & Prospective Studies (IEAPS),  
Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco  
 
 
Abstract 
 This paper focuses on testing if natural resources constituted a blessing or a curse to the 
progress of knowledge economy in Arab countries.  Some of these economies are based on 
natural resources and mainly oil and gas that are major sources of economic rents. The attained 
results from all the sample of Arab countries, show how knowledge variables are negatively 
related to the rents from natural resources. Natural resources appear thus as a curse to the 
expansion of knowledge economy in the overall set of countries. But, when taken country by 
country as in the literature, natural resources as blessing are shown over some economies. 
Transformation of curse to a sustainable blessings is the promising economic and social direction 
of change that could increase further inclusive growth in the Arab economies.  
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Introduction 
The literature on natural resources rents looks at the effects of these resources as a 
curse or blessings to development, from different views. It refers to the existence of a 
curse in most oil abundant economies while it often indicates that these rents could be a 
blessing under specific managerial and policy frameworks. Arab countries and mainly 
those of Algeria, Libya and the Middle East as net exporters of oil and gas achieve 
important rents and revenues from these exhaustive natural resources.  Outside these 
activities, only few economic opportunities have been mobilized during the last years in 
these countries. As some of these economies are already facing the post-oil era in relation 
to the trends taking place in oil and gas industries, with future possibilities of exhaustion 
of reserves, diversification of economic activities has been emerging in some of these 
economies. But, the creation of new portfolios has not been expanded outside the 
traditional spectrum of activities. Besides that, public sovereign funds are still playing an 
important role both domestically and internationally implying that rents from natural 
resources are still promising sources of economic development.  
This paper addresses questions that show how economic rents from natural 
resources in Arab countries are driving the development paths in relation to their access 
to knowledge economy. As such, it focuses on estimating the links between knowledge 
variables and rents from natural resources. This is to test if natural resources constitute a 
curse or a blessing factor to the expansion of the knowledge economy and economic 
development.  
After a literature review on the major findings about the links between rents and 
development, a second section focuses on data and methods. The third section 
emphasizes the empirical analysis of data before estimating the relationships between 
subsets of knowledge variables and rents.  
A preliminary version of this paper looked at the links between rents from natural 
resources and knowledge components. It addressed the major effects of economic rents 
on development. It did not clearly interpret the results in relation to the curse and blessing 
and their linkages to knowledge variables (Driouchi, 2014).  
 
 
I. Literature Review 
In an early paper by Sachs and Warner (1997), natural resource abundance is 
related to economic growth. The authors observe that economies with a high ratio of 
natural resources to GDP in 1970 tend to grow slowly during the period 1970-1990. 
Additional evidence is then discussed to understand the negative relationship between 
resource abundance and economic growth. Gaitan and Roe (2012) remind the readers 
about the phenomenon of “natural resource curse” where countries with oil and other 
natural resources have grown less rapidly than those countries without. The authors also 
refer to the historical background about economics of exhaustible resources and the 
increased attention received, following Sachs and Warner’s (1997) suggestion that 
countries with ample natural resources tend to grow less rapidly than natural resource-
scarce countries. Gaitan and Roe (2012) develop an infinite-horizon, two-country model 
of trade with identical economies, except that one country is endowed with deposits of an 
exhaustible resource and the other is not. Within the context of the model, they show that 
this phenomenon can be explained in part by an inelastic demand for the exhaustible 
resource that increases growth in trade revenues and induces the resource-abundant 
country to invest relatively less than the country lacking exhaustible resources. Cotet and 
Tsui (2010) study the effects of oil rents on development based on a world panel dataset 
focusing on oil discoveries and extractions. They first test the hypothesis of the negative 
relationship between oil endowment and economic performance to find little robust 
evidence about that. Lange and Motinga (1997) already mentioned the specific status of 
both exhaustible and renewable resources in relation to the rents generated through these 
activities. To these authors, resources like minerals and fisheries generate “resource 
rents,” or income above the normal return to capital invested in these activities. El 
Anshary (2011) focuses on the “curse” outcome in oil based economies as related to 
market shocks such as those of 1970 and 2000s but the author considers that the 
magnitude also depends on the composition of public spending and the use of the 
generated oil rents. Carneiro (2007) looks at the development challenges facing resource-
rich economies with focus on oil exporting countries. The author introduces the “paradox 
of plenty” to refer to the likely negative externalities that may be related to natural 
resources. Series of macroeconomic policies are suggested to overcome any negative 
effect related to the abundance of natural resources. Di John (2011) attempts a critical 
survey of theory and evidence about the resource curse. The author looks at the literature 
on Dutch disease, “rentier state” and rent seeking versions of the resource curse. 
Important shortcomings of these approaches are found. To the author, there is a threshold 
below which the risk of curse can be higher and above which better economic 
performance is achieved. Frankel (2010) also considers that it is striking how often 
countries with oil or other natural resource wealth have failed to grow faster than those 
without.  
But, other publications have shown the role of good governance in transforming 
potential curse into a blessing. Cappelen and Mjoset (2009) describe the changes and the 
improvements in Norwegian economy from 1950-1970 to the current era. The authors 
noticed the attainment of higher per capita income and the high level of human 
development. They attribute that, to the petroleum sector but mainly to the policies and 
types of governance pursued in comparison with other natural resource abundant 
economies. Hartzok (2004) looks at the dividends from oil resource rents with focus on 
Alaska, Norway and Nigeria. According to the author, citizens of Alaska have been 
receiving payments from an oil rent trust fund since 1982. In Norway, the population is 
provided with social services with investments in an oil rent fund. Nigeria has been in the 
process of setting similar fund. The paper focuses on the oil rent institutions and their 
optimal use to support the needs of the population. Ebeke and Ombga (2011) discuss oil 
rents and allocation of talents in relation to the quality of governance in a sample of 69 
developing economies. The authors conclude that good governance leads to orient talents 
towards productive activities while lower quality governance may induce human resource 
allocation to rent-seeking. Paltseva and Roine (2011) deal with the issue of resource curse 
while indicating that key economic policies can transform resource rents into engine of 
development. Kurtz and Brooks (2011) discuss the oil curse within the framework of 
globalization and human capital growth. In this context, the resource curse becomes a 
developmental opportunity. This paper introduces the roles of domestic human capital in 
ensuring technological advancement, absorption and progress of new economies and 
sectors that can be linked or not to the oil economy. These trends are further amplified by 
globalization and international markets where major gains are captured by human capital 
and then by the virtuous spiral of economic growth and development. The findings of 
Davis and Tilton (2005) suggest series of various policies for different countries 
possessing rich mineral deposits. The positive relationship between natural resources and 
development has often been questioned on empirical evidence that is not all the time 
appropriate. Developing countries need more development and natural resources can be 
important assets in this process. In their paper, Busse and Gröning (2011) investigate the 
relationship between the natural resources and the governance indicators. This research 
uses a panel data and an instrumental variable method to explain the correlation between 
the variables and the error terms. The authors find evidence about an increase in the 
corruption rate due to the export of the natural resources. Moreover, the results for other 
governance indicators are not significant (bureaucracy) or are not found (law and order).   
Other sets of publications have emphasized the empirical nature of the problems 
related to natural resources. Fleming and Measham (2013) list ten assumptions related to 
resource curse in relation to policies. The authors focus on the local effect of the natural 
resources rather than their effects on the country as a whole. To the authors, a natural 
resource can be either a blessing or a curse to the area holding this activity. They explain 
that the difference in opinions over the blessing or curse of a natural resource resides in 
understanding the meaning of a resource curse and its impact on its area (regionally and 
nationally). Leonov and Volchkova (2013) test two hypotheses to study the Dutch disease 
over a period of twenty years. The results show that the openness and high revenues do 
not create a significant difference in the development of the industry whether the country 
has resources or not. The authors state that the government to remedy the decrease in 
industrialization uses the Dutch disease. They suggest loosening the policies in countries 
rich in resources because imposing policies to control for the Dutch disease when it does 
not exist may create more important and harmful problems. Konte (2012) studies the 
relationship between the economic growth pace of a country and the blessing or curse of 
the natural resources. This research shows that the level of democracy (democratic or 
autocratic) affects the types of effects of natural resources either as a blessing or a curse 
of having natural resource while accounting for education and the economic 
organizations involved.  Ragnar (2009) studies the differences between the countries for 
which the natural resources are either a blessing or a curse. The author investigates 
theories of the resource curse. The author states that politics affect the blessing or curse 
of a natural resource. He added that the curse resides in relying on the natural resources 
and not diversifying their activities. The author states that there is a relationship between 
economic development and the natural resources. He adds that resource-poor countries 
develop quicker than resource-rich countries because they rely on their natural resources 
economically. In his critical review Malik (2013) praises the research of Ragnar (2009), 
and considers it a good starting point to study the relationship between the natural 
resources abundance and the economic growth. Weber (2013) finds in the south-central 
U.S. an initial rise of symptoms of a curse in the 2000s. These effects are a reduction in 
the compensation and in workforce in other sectors. The author states that greater 
production does not result in less educated population. The results show that oil 
abundance in the south-central U.S. promotes a long-term economic development. Ross 
and Andersen (2012) claim that the resource curse exists and reexamined the data and 
previous models. Ross and Andersen show that the findings from previous are correct for 
the period before 1970. However, the “Resource Curse” was prominent after 1980. The 
research show that the oil resources constitute a barrier to the democratic development 
after 1970 where the oil rents start to go to the government.  Elbadawi and Gelb (2010) 
suggest that the oil curse depends on the bad governance, high volatility rates and an 
overvaluation of the exchange rate. The export, manufacture, low product sophistication 
constitute the main areas where the resource curse show. This research investigates the 
means to escape the “resource curse” and the role that economic policies can do to 
promote the export diversification the sophistication and the density of product space. 
Some publications have focused on Arab countries. Akarli (2007) studies the 
situation of six Arab countries in the Gulf Region (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain) where it has been shown that their natural resources 
constitute a blessing for each country as it increases their economic revenues and 
standards of living. Clement (2004) claims that the oil rent can be either a curse or a 
blessing for Algeria. This country can model best the effect of the misused oil rent. It 
suffered for a long time from the civil war and the economic adjustments. This research is 
concerned with the analysis that the natural resources in Algeria are not the cause of its 
actual crisis. It discusses that the deficiency in the Algerian system as well as its 
government is due to the French colonialism rather than the natural resources. All the 
difficulties and crises the country went through weakened it and conditioned the natural 
resources exploitation in hand with the rent. In fact, Algeria can use the rent to support its 
budget to finance its future projects. The author states that the natural resources can be a 
means to heal the country. El-Katiri, Fattouh and Segal (2011) analyze the oil rent 
distribution in Kuwait. They say that different countries have adopted strategies for using 
the oil rents to cover the needs of the population. To the author the best practice is 
provided by Norway where oil and gas represent 27 % of GDP (2008) and 50 % of 
exports. The receipts of the oil fund are distributed transparently to the current population 
while accounting also for future generations. Such a model is suggested for Kuwait by 
the authors. In their paper, the authors find that Kuwait considers its natural resources as 
a blessing. Elbadwi and Makdisi (2013) analyze the factors that underlie the transition 
taking place in the Arab economies. The authors find that rents from oil and other 
minerals do negatively to affect democracy when not managed appropriately. The results 
also suggest that home conflicts limit democratic transitions. The causal mechanisms that 
could explain that resource rents can constitute constraints to democratization are also 
discussed. Bricker and Foley (2013) attempt to link series of social and economic 
phenomena to the existence of rents from natural resources through using series of 
economic models. The authors find that in the context of Middle East, rents from natural 
resources need to be used to further include the youth in labor markets. A very promising 
attempt made by Boucekkine, Prieur and Puzon (2013) has consisted in introducing a 
political game with two players that are the reformists and the conservative elite. 
Uncertainty is also introduced with high and low rents from natural resources. The results 
show that shifts to reforms and liberalization are not obvious in the case of Arab 
countries. The authors underline that the political liberalization at stake in the case of a 
typical oil exporter in the Arab region need also to ensure the coverage of the related 
risks.  Haouas and Heshmati (2014) show that the Gulf Countries Council (GCC) as a set 
of oil exporting economies have failed to address the issue of oil curse.  To the authors, 
GCC countries are in this sense lagging behind other groups of economies. The paper 
looks then in more details to the case of United Arab Emirates (UAE) as facing an oil 
curse. The authors recognize the progress made towards economic diversification but 
focus on the vulnerability of UAE economy to external shocks. Al-Irani (2012) proved 
that Yemen is also affected by the Natural Resource Curse. The research showed that the 
governmental policies worsen the resource curse effect on the country’s development. 
The mismanagement of oil and the political economy of oil resulted in political instability 
and conflict. Kabbashi (2012) investigates the Resource Curse issue on Sudan. The 
research findings state that the Dutch disease and the fiscal linkages are responsible for 
the negative effect of the oil boom. The impact of the pursued distributive policies 
increase the impact of the resource curse. This latter is negatively affected by the fiscal 
policy and leads to an overestimation of the currency that weakens public institutions.  
 
A natural resource as a curse or blessing to an economy is an empirical question that 
needs further investigation for each economy at each period of time. The enhancements 
of the managerial and governance processes are capable of transforming curses to 
blessings and thus benefitting to the knowledge economy and then to the overall 
development. But, further analyzes are needed given the complexity of different linkages 
between natural resources and development. This is pursued in the coming sections of the 
present paper with further analyzes on the relationship between economic rents and the 
components of the knowledge economy.  
II. Methods and Data 
 
The major issue introduced here relates to the practical significance of rents without 
omitting the theories related to economics of rents as developed by different schools of 
economics. In this sense, a rent occurs when there is an excess profit that is generated 
under market imperfections. As well developed with the natural resource economics 
literature, mining exhaustible resources often leads to market imperfections thus to excess 
profits.  
In the sense of World Bank data, rents are measured as percentages of GDP in each 
country. As such, the total rent from natural resources includes those from exhaustible 
resources (oil, gas and coal) and that from a renewable resource that is forestry. Rents 
account for the difference between valuations at world prices and domestic production 
costs (World Bank, 2011). For oil and gas, the related rents are consequently the 
difference between the value of crude oil at world prices and the total costs of its 
production. Similarly, the forestry rents are measured by the flow of forest products 
valued at both world prices and domestic costs of their production. The same definition 
applies for coal rents and then for the total rents from natural resources. As reported 
above, the estimates of different types of rents are based on sources and methods 
described in "The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in 
the New Millennium" (World Bank, 2011). 
Economic rents do exist with natural exhaustible and renewable resources. They can be 
collected by a government as royalties or extraction fees in the case of minerals and oil 
and gas. Series of economists have recognized that economic rents are "excess returns" 
above "normal levels" that take place in competitive markets. More specifically, it is a 
return in excess of the resource owner's opportunity cost. 
Based on World Bank datasets (World Bank, 2011), rents are considered to be originating 
from oil and gas, coal extraction and forestry activities. As they are representing the 
excess returns between their valuation at international world prices and their domestic 
production costs, each value is composed of both quantity and price effects. In order to 
investigate the likely trends taking place in each economy, the quantity effect is first 
described through variables represented by the percent area of land covered by forests 
and the total energy produced in oil equivalent (World Bank, 2011). These preliminary 
investigations are introduced under the following descriptive analysis. 
III. Results of the Empirical Investigation 
The results obtained below include those related to time trends in rents and knowledge 
besides the outcomes of regressions relating knowledge components to rents from natural 
resources.   
 
1. Trends in total rents from natural resources 
 
A decreasing trend might mean that the country is likely to be diversifying its economy 
while an increasing trend would show that more pressure is placed only on total natural 
resources. Algeria, Sudan, Syria, and Libya show increasing trends in total rents from 
natural resources. Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, the United Arab of Emirates, and Bahrain 
exhibit decreasing trends implying that diversification is likely to be pursued in these 
economies. Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen show 
stagnating trends in total rents from natural resources meaning that no major changes 
have been taking place in either in resource expansion or in diversification. The negative 
trends in total natural resource rents are though in favor of knowledge enhancement while 
positive trends show social costs paid to the knowledge economy. Any improvement in 
knowledge indices can be then related to other variables that are not included in this 
framework (table 1). More details about the yearly rents from oil and gas are in the 
appendices.  
 
Table 1: Trends in Total Rents as Percent of GDP (Source of Raw data: World Bank databases) 
 
Country Intercept Trend R2 
Algeria 13.7726 
(4.8673) 
4.8673 
(3.2122) 
0.2135 
Egypt 13.6776 
(4.8417) 
0.0359 
(0.2882) 
0.0021 
Jordan 0.5203 
(1.0732) 
0.0115 
(0.5378) 
0.0075 
Kuwait 57.8131 
(10.8939) 
-0.3541 
(-1.5120) 
0.0567 
Mauritania 10.1469 
(4.7114) 
0.1861 
(1.9582) 
0.0916 
 
Morocco 2.9534 
(4.1912) 
-0.0550 
(-1.7710) 
0.0762 
Oman 54.1377 
(13.7739) 
-0.4106 
(-2.3673) 
0.1285 
Qatar 63.7910 
(14.8946) 
-0.8039 
(-4.2537) 
0.3225 
Saudi 49.9980 
(10.1233) 
-0.2158 
(-0.9904) 
0.0251 
Sudan -3.7543 
(-2.4859) 
0.4980 
(7.4729) 
0.5950 
Syria 5.6234 
(3.4479) 
0.6001 
(8.3382) 
0.6465 
Tunisia 9.8502 
(7.3406) 
-0.1468 
(-2.4798) 
0.1392 
UAE 65.1689 
(17.3926) 
-1.1614 
(-7.0242) 
0.5649 
Yemen 26.9224 
(8.4888) 
0.3756 
(1.3161) 
0.0877 
Libya 18.1439 
(4.2292) 
2.3013 
(5.9613) 
0.6637 
Bahrain 47.9820 
(10.0476) 
-0.9852 
(-3.4841) 
0.3024 
Lebanon 0.0339 
(8.7964) 
-0.0017 
(-5.6009) 
0.6106 
 
 
When looking at the decomposition of total rents, the trends related to forestry rents 
appear to vary from one country to the other. Of course, countries without forest rents are 
not included in the analysis and only those exhibiting rents are considered.  The trends in 
forestry rents in Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia are all 
decreasing while they are stagnating in Sudan and Syria (table 2). 
Table 2: Trends in Forestry Rents 
Country Intercept Trend R2 
Algeria 0.2068 
(9.8728) 
-0.0022 
(-2.4128) 
0.1328 
Egypt 0.6441 
(27.6176) 
-0.0127 
(-12.3602) 
0.8008 
Mauritania 1.0426 
(25.6964) 
-0.0059 
(-3.3166) 
0.2244 
Morocco 0.6666 
(21.5089) 
-0.0161 
(-11.7903) 
0.7853 
Jordan 0.0402 
(12.6049) 
-0.0004 
(-2.9414) 
0.1854 
Sudan 1.7591 
(8.2443) 
-0.0083 
(-0.8901) 
0.0204 
Syria 0.0148 -2.19365E-05 0.0005 
(4.3972) (-0.1474) 
Tunisia 0.3121 
(21.1239) 
-0.0044 
(-6.8620) 
0.5534 
 
 
 
2. Time trends in Oil Rents 
 
All Arab countries are considered in the trend analysis of rents from gas and oil as they 
all have data on rents from oil and gas. While some countries appear to be lowering rents, 
others have had increasing trends with countries having stagnating rents. Iraq, Syria, 
Libya, and Sudan show increasing trends in oil rents. Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, the United 
Arab of Emirates, Bahrain, and Jordan exhibit decreasing trends. The trends in oil rents in 
Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi and Yemen are all shown to be stagnating. These results 
indicate that the negative trends are consistent with either depletion of stocks or with the 
diversification strategy. Positive trends are mainly consistent with either new discoveries 
of oil and gas or with reduction of other activities (table 3).  
Table 3: Time trends in Oil Rents for Exporting Countries 
 
Country Intercept Trend R² 
Algeria 14.8439 
(6.3151) 
-0.0429 
(-0.4137) 
0.0044 
Egypt 14.8406 
(5.6044) 
-0.1668 
(-1.4280) 
0.0509 
Iraq 23.5914 
(3.7924) 
1.7572 
(6.4011) 
0.5188 
Kuwait 56.2508 
(10.7815) 
-0.3770 
(-1.6374) 
0.0659 
Oman 57.1422 
(17.1008) 
-0.7429 
(-5.0380) 
0.4004 
Qatar 64.6162 
(17.3756) 
-1.2955 
(-7.8942) 
0.6212 
Saudi 50.2773 
(10.3215) 
-0.3222 
(-1.4990) 
0.0558 
Syria 6.5554 
(4.0856) 
0.4841 
(6.8376) 
0.5516 
Tunisia 8.8256 -0.1505 0.1622 
(7.0188) (-2.7127) 
UAE 59.4558 
(15.6604) 
-1.1291 
(-6.7394) 
0.5444 
Libya 19.5358 
(4.8269) 
1.6504 
(5.0027) 
0.5558 
Sudan -5.3082 
(-3.2105) 
 
1.2631 
(9.3724) 
0.8145 
Bahrain 41.7038 
(10.1859) 
-1.0763 
(-4.4395) 
0.4131 
Jordan 0.02182 
(10.0773) 
-0.0008 
(-6.4938) 
0.6009 
Yemen 26.8893 
(8.4443) 
0.3730 
(1.3018) 
0.0860 
 
3. Outcomes of Regression Analyzes 
 
The above concerns lead to attempting linking the rents with knowledge variables to test 
whether they facilitate or constrain access to knowledge and development.  Regressions 
are pursued to test these hypotheses in the context of the overall world sample and for 
Arab countries. For that purpose, the components of Knowledge Economy are used. They 
are represented by education (EDU), innovation (INN), economic incentives regime 
(EIR) and information and communication (ICT) besides the indices knowledge index 
(KI) and KEI. The average rents are used as explanatory variables under different 
combinations but the AVG2000 as the average rents during the years 2000 (meaning 
from 2000 to 2010) appear to capture the variable needed in the regressions given below.  
Table 4: Regression Analysis: Effects of rents on knowledge variables: Overall World Sample 
Dependent 
Variable 
Constant AVG 2000 ICT R² Observations 
EDU 0.028 
(.658) 
-0.042 
(-1.980) 
0.913 
(15.492) 
0.761 95 
INN 0.294 
(10.314) 
-0.043 
(-3.019) 
0.620 
(15.553) 
0.772 95 
EIR 0.341 
(5.098) 
-0.106 
(-3.196) 
0.483 
(5.169) 
0.364 95 
KI 0.149 
(7.669) 
-.028 
(-2.942) 
0.796 
(29.308) 
0.918 95 
KEI .222 
(10.179) 
-0.043 
(-3.932) 
0.697 
(22.888) 
0.878 95 
 
In the overall sample of 95 countries, the relationships between each knowledge variable 
selected as independent variable, a high level of linearity is established (as shown by R2  
between 0.364 and 0.918). The explanatory variables that show statistically significant 
(1% level) effects (except EDU that is significant at 5 % level) on each of the knowledge 
variables, are the average rate of total rents as percent of GDP over the period 2000-2009 
(AVG 2000) and ICT that also exhibits statistically significant effects. The above results 
show that knowledge variables are highly sensitive to the average rate of rents and to 
ICT. While the effects of ICT are all positive and good drivers of the other knowledge 
variables, the effects of rents are all negative. This implies that any increase (decrease) in 
rents decreases (increases) the related knowledge variable. 
As they are limited observations in the group of Arab countries (16), the explanatory 
variables used that appear to provide good responses are the average rents of 1970 
(AVG70) (1970-1979), the average of 1990 (AVG90) (1990-1999) and the average of 
rents over 2000-2009 (AVG2000). Other variables such as AVG80 and ICT as shown in 
the overall model were tried and eliminated for reasons of multicollinearity. Under this 
framework that appears to be statistically relevant with R2 between 0.207 and 0.833, the 
AVG 90 variable does not exhibit statistically significant effects. But, AVG2000 and 
AVG70 show statistically significant results for the variables EIR12, KI12, KEI12, 
EDU09, INN09, EIR09 and KI09 and KEI09. The level of significance is 5 % for KI12, 
EDU09 and KI09. It is 1 % for the other variables (EIR12, KEI12, INN09, EIR09 and 
KEI09. In some cases, both effects of AVG2000 and AVG70 are observed.  
 
While the effects of the average rents for the period 2000-2009 are negative, the effects 
of the average rents over the period 1970-1979 are positive. This means that over the 
period 2000-2009, the increase in rent decreases the related knowledge variables. But, the 
net effects: EIR12 (-0.835 and 0.806), for KEI12 (-0.494 and 0.439), for KI12 (-0.433 
and 0.358), for INN09 (-0.347 and 0.316), for EIR09 (-.830 and 0.860), and for KEI09 (-
0.412 and 0.371) could be negative. This implies that the net effect of average rents is 
negatively related to most knowledge variables as represented by the above components. 
Table 5: Regression Analysis: Effects of rents on knowledge variables: Arab Countries 
Dependent 
Variable 
Constant AVG 90 AVG2000 AVG70 R² N° 
Observations 
ICT 12 0.605 
(6.705) 
-0.011 
(-0.045) 
-0.269 
(-1.204) 
0.337 
(1.631) 
0.239 16 
EDU12 0.588 
(5.658) 
0.211 
(0.454) 
-0.644 
(.028) 
0.430 
(0.096) 
0.364 16 
INN12 0.617 
(10.782) 
0.143 
(0.359) 
-0.507 
(.004) 
0.378 
(.014) 
0.557 16 
EIR12 0.603 
(10.914) 
0.063 
(0.437) 
-0.835 
(-6.104) 
0.806 
(6.373) 
0.821 16 
KI12 0.613 
(8.252) 
0.097 
(0.499) 
-0.433 
(-2.350) 
0.358 
(2.102) 
0.372 16 
KEI12 0.615 
(9.561) 
0.080 
(0.473) 
-0.494 
(-3.105) 
0.439 
(2.983) 
0.523 16 
ICT09 0.684 
(9.618) 
0.065 
(0.347) 
-0.275 
(-1.563) 
 
0.226 
(1.385) 
0.207 16 
EDU09 0.586 
(6.533) 
0.215 
(0.912) 
-0.496 
(-2.234) 
0.292 
(1.424) 
0.305 16 
INN09 0.625 
(13.247) 
0.034 
(0.273) 
-0.347 
(-2.965) 
0.316 
(2.921) 
0.501 16 
EIR09 0.600 
(11.015) 
-0.009 
(-0.061) 
-0.820 
(-6.073) 
0.860 
(6.894) 
0.833 16 
KI09 0.639 
(10.601) 
0.086 
(0.547) 
-0.346 
(-2.318) 
0.269 
(1.948) 
0.351 16 
KEI09 0.634 
(11.846) 
0.055 
(0.394) 
-0.412 
(-3.112) 
0.371 
(3.031) 
0.525 16 
 
 
Is there a change in rent structure and what are the likely effects on knowledge variables? 
This leads to considering the regressions of knowledge variables on differencing and then 
the squared differences of rents to capture the effects on knowledge variables (table 6).  
Table 6: Regression Analysis: Effects of  differential rents as shown below the table: Arab Countries 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Constant Diff DiffSqu R² Observations 
KEI09 0.636 
(16.845) 
-.419 
(-2.159) 
0.044 
(0.185) 
.517 16 
KI09 0.632 
(16.997) 
-0.302 
(-2.652) 
- 0.334 16 
EIR09 0.657 
(17.997) 
-0.614 
(-3.268) 
-0.335 
(-1.443) 
.846 16 
INN09 0.622 
(21.549) 
-0.329 
(-3.724) 
- 0.498 16 
EDU09 0.557 
(9.856) 
-0.380 
(-2.196) 
- 0.256 16 
ICT09 0.659 
(14.218) 
-0.545 
(-2.286) 
0.436 
(1.483) 
0.312 16 
KEI12 0.620 
(13.599) 
-0.522 
(-2.224) 
0.086 
(0.296) 
0.510 16 
KI12 0.618 
(13.454) 
-0.390 
(-2.773 
- 0.354 16 
EIR12 0.647 
(17.225) 
-0.608 
(-3.142) 
-0.310 
(-1.296) 
0.83 16 
INN12 0.601 
(14.512) 
-0.475 
(-2.227) 
0.060 
(0.228) 
0.525 16 
EDU12 0.546 
(8.378) 
-0.522 
(-2.620) 
- 0.329 16 
ICT12 0.630 
(10.314) 
-0.675 
(-2.150) 
0.538 
(1.388) 
0.287 16 
Note : *Diff=Difference between log (%Rent in GDP, Average 2000-2009) and log (% Rent in GDP, 
Average 1970-1997) and *DiffSqu=Diff squared. 
 
The above regression results show that all indices and sub-indices related to knowledge 
economic index are negatively related to the explanatory variable representing the rate of 
rents in GDP per country. The indices used as independent variables in these regressions 
account for the difference between the average of the logarithmic values over the years 
2000-2009 of the percent rent in GDP per country and the logarithmic values over the 
years 1970-1979 of the percent rate in GDP per country. It also includes the squared 
value of this index. But, in these regressions, the coefficients related to the squared values 
of the index appear to be statistically non significant.  
These results show that the overall KEI of 2009 and of 2012 have respective coefficients 
of -0.419 and -0.522 while the related KI for the same years exhibit responses of -0.302 
and -0.390 respectively for 2009 and 2012. Similarly, when INN09, INN12 are the 
dependent variables, the respective effects are -0.329 and -0.475. EDU09 and EDU12 
exhibit also responses that are -0.380 and -0.522. The levels of responses of ICT09, 
ICT12, EIR09 and EIR12 are given as -0.545, -0.675, -0.674 and -0.608.  
The results show how the rate of rent in GDP per country influences the level of 
knowledge attainment as this is measured by knowledge economy and knowledge indices 
besides the sub-components of the KEI. Otherwise, larger dependency on oil, gas and 
forestry rents as included in the World Bank data lowers the levels of knowledge 
attainment in case of positive values of the independent variable. Countries with lower 
rents might have higher levels in the knowledge attainment indices in case of positive 
values of the independent variable. These coefficients can be interpreted as effects of 
rents on knowledge gains or losses for countries. Those with higher levels of rents have 
higher costs in the knowledge sphere while lower costs are observed in countries with 
lower dependency on oil, gas and forests. Countries such as Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia are having extra-benefits in the 
area of knowledge from the rent economy. Jordan, Egypt, Mauritania, Sudan, Syria, 
Yemen and Algeria are those countries that pay knowledge tribute to their rent based 
economy. In the sense of the selected index for rent representation, the 2000/1970 ratio is 
explained such that less than one implies a negative value in logarithms while positive 
values are ensured under the values of the ratio that are higher than one. This might mean 
that the concerned countries have lowered their dependency on rents in the economy 
when the original ratio representing the average rent in percent of GDP if the value for 
the years 2000 is lower than the one that prevailed in 1970’s. This is a sign of 
diversification and less dependency on oil, gas and forests. Newer discoveries of new 
natural resources may show figures where the 2000 rent is higher than that of 1970. The 
following table 8 shows how rents could be used to rank countries. Using AVG 2000 
(rents that occurred in years 2000), Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco appear to have the 
lowest ranks with few oil resources.  The Gulf countries have the highest ranks and 
appear at end of the list.  
Table 7: Total Rents as percent of GDP (source WB) ranked by the average rents that 
occurred at different decades 2000 (2000-2011), 90 (1990-1999), 80 (1980-1989) and 70 
(1970-1979) 
 
Ranked by AVG2000 
   
      
 
AVG2000 AVG90 AVG80 AVG70 
Ratio2000 
over 1970 
Lebanon 0.006424 0.019681 0.007912 0.0079 0.813145 
Jordan 1.323509 0.236457 0.356531 1.062412 1.245759 
Morocco 1.549818 0.581404 2.230848 3.155989 0.491072 
Tunisia 5.41763 3.566321 10.97922 7.983697 0.678587 
Egypt 15.15793 10.34191 22.12079 9.893038 1.532182 
Sudan 18.18588 2.831486 1.170472 1.641631 11.07793 
Mauritania 21.41986 8.129692 10.70619 14.84876 1.442535 
Syria 25.30291 23.52125 12.36641 8.11405 3.118407 
Bahrain 30.41538 23.75888 46.91227 46.91 0.648377 
UAE 31.52792 31.42353 40.59285 45.73739 0.689325 
Yemen 33.34589 27.63558 27.63 27.63 1.206872 
Algeria 33.65206 16.17218 16.34645 20.20645 1.665412 
Qatar 44.76356 33.72777 47.888 66.07603 0.677455 
Kuwait 47.78578 37.06023 47.31588 65.47057 0.729882 
Oman 49.11157 32.6585 43.19188 59.5618 0.824548 
S.Arabia 50.43384 34.48267 42.98475 55.25291 0.912782 
 
 
Both the descriptive and regression analyzes pursued in this paper to show that rents from 
exhaustible natural resources are likely to be negatively affecting the knowledge 
economy indices. This is an empirical result based on rents as shares of GDP and 
knowledge variables as provided by World Bank data. The regression results mainly for 
oil and gas show that all indices and sub-indices related to knowledge economic 
measurements are negatively related to the explanatory variable representing the rate of 
rents as a share of GDP per country. The indices used as independent variables in these 
regressions account for the difference between the average of the logarithmic values over 
the years 2000-2009 of the percent rent in GDP per country and the logarithmic values 
over the years 1970-1979 of the percent rate in GDP per country. It also includes the 
squared value of this index. But, in these regressions, the coefficients related to the 
squared values of the index appear to be statistically non significant. These results show 
that Arab countries need to investigate new financial mechanisms with the development 
of new knowledge based policies that could promote further development. The cases of 
developed economies and some developing countries provide examples that could be 
followed by oil and gas exporters.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Both the exhaustible and renewable resources available in Arab countries generate rents 
that are likely to be further mobilized for development and where the knowledge 
economy components could become important drivers for inclusive growth. Current and 
future levels of rents related to oil and gas are too important and need to be further 
directed to research, education, innovation, enterprise creation and creation of new 
technologies and institutions. The managerial and governance components are likely to 
play an important role in mobilizing these rents towards higher social efficiency.  
There are countries that are successful in generating further access to knowledge 
economy through a better use of funds based on rents from natural resources. These 
economies could be used as starting models to improve the use of rents. Participation and 
inclusion of all to these processes are means to ensure the improvement of the 
governance towards creating new enterprises and enlarging the market economies in the 
Arab world. The risks of exhaustion of rents and moves towards more diversification 
push also for a higher access to the knowledge economy through the efficient use of the 
current rents. This dynamic process is by itself knowledge based and needs to be 
continuously run to capture future opportunities for further inclusive growth in the Arab 
economies. But, the overall results attained in this paper show how natural resource rents 
constitute a curse for the future pursuit of knowledge economy development and 
adoption. But as discussed in the literature review, some Arab countries are shown with 
blessings from natural resources. This call for further analysis of the data for each 
individual Arab country. But, the transformation of curse to a sustainable blessings is the 
promising economic and social direction of change that could increase further inclusive growth in 
the Arab economies.  
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